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A CRITICAL RESPONSE TO THE
INTERPRETIVIST
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
OF MEESE AND THURMOND
CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN*
A society based on the letter of the law and never reaching any
higher fails to take advantage of the full range of human pos-
sibilities. The letter of the law is too cold and formal to have a
beneficial influence on society. Whenever the tissue of life is
woven of legislative relationships, this creates an atmosphere
of spiritual mediocrity that paralyzes man's noblest impulses. 1
The volume of materials written debating the viability of
any given theory of constitutional interpretation is, to say the
least, intimidating. One has only to read the foregoing articles
to become immersed in the abundance, divergence, and com-
plexity of constitutional interpretation. Yet in this bicenten-
nial year,2 it is perhaps most appropriate that we join our
colleagues in commenting upon and celebrating, at least to
some extent, that document which gives written expression to
our most fundamental American ideals. Moreover, inasmuch
as there is little dispute regarding the nature of the Constitu-
tion, it is with that premise that we begin.
As Betty Southard Murphy aptly writes in her article,
"[t]he Framers of the Constitution shared a burning desire to
establish a republic such as the world had never seen."' 3 In
essence, what the Framers devised was an ideal - a utopian
republic which had theretofore existed nowhere and for which
no viable blueprint could be found. Its purpose was to regu-
late the relationship between the state and national govern-
ments in a federalist system. Although the Constitution
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.
1. A. SOLZHENiTSYN, A WORLD SPLIT APART, 17-19 (1978) (commencement ad-
dress delivered at Harvard University, June 8, 1978).
2. The Constitution of the United States will be 200 years old on September 17,
1987.
3. Murphy, Economic Liberty: An Exploration of the Link Between the Constitution
of the United States, Materialism and Basic Freedom, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 443, 443
(1987).
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ultimately proposed as well to secure to its people certain fun-
damental rights and liberties, the latter was achieved only sub-
stantially later, through the Bill of Rights and Civil War
amendments.4 Nevertheless, it is this concept of the Constitu-
tion as an ideal that appears to have generated most of the
controversy in interpretive theory - a controversy which has
largely polarized constitutional theoreticians and scholars.
Moreover, since the courts have been constitutionally en-
trusted with the role of "interpretation,"' 6 it is the role of the
judiciary which has been most scrutinized and most vocifer-
ously debated by the various proponents of a given interpre-
tive theory. Ultimately, that debate focuses on the nature of
judicial review and the power of courts to arbitrate constitu-
tional meaning.
Perhaps the most prominent among the interpretive theo-
ries and that which merits discussion here because it is es-
4. The Bill of Rights amendments, those numbered one through 10, were not
adopted until 1791. The Civil War Amendments, those numbered 13 (abolition of slav-
ery), 14 (due process) and 15 (equal suffrage irrespective of race, color or prior condi-
tion of servitude), were adopted in 1865, 1868, and 1870 respectively. F6r an interesting
historical assessment of the importance of the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment,
see Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986).
5. For an excellent explication of the divergence and inadequacy of traditional con-
stitutional theory, see Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1189, 1209-30 (1987).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this
constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public min-
isters and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two
or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of
different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of
different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States,
citizens or subjects.
See also, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), reprinted in CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12, 16 (V. G. Rosenblum ed. 1973):
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitu-
tion apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case
conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these con-
flicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
Id. See also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 705
(1975).
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poused by many, including Attorney General Edwin Meese,7
is "constitutional interpretivism." As its nomenclature sug-
gests, this theory posits that courts should be confined to en-
forcing norms that are stated explicitly or clearly implied
within the written Constitution. 8 Its themes are succinctly de-
scribed by Professor Richard Fallon in his recent article advo-
cating a "constructivist coherence" theory:
Interpretivism, as this school is called, attempts to exclude
value arguments insofar as possible from the constitutional
calculus. The logic of the interpretivist position calls for re-
ducing arguments from precedent to prior interpretations of
text and the framers' intent. Interpretivism also rejects ar-
guments of constitutional theory that depart from the intent
of the framers. 9
Thus Attorney General Meese, like other strict interpretivists,
lauds the "meaning intended and understood by those who
framed, proposed, and ratified its [the Constitution's] various
parts" 10 and decries the fact that "non-interpretivism" looks
to extra-constitutional values as a basis on which to determine
constitutional meaning."1 Such polarizing rhetoric, of course,
belies the inherent problem associated with the classical or
strict interpretivist position - that being, who were "the
Framers," what did they intend, and did they intend for us to
be constrained by their "intent?"
Generally, the "Framers" of the Constitution are consid-
ered to be the fifty-five male delegates to the Philadelphia
Convention of 1787, who set about to devise a Constitution.
They include as well the Congressional sponsors and support-
ers of the subsequent Bill of Rights and Civil War amend-
ments. However, as Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, "[a]ll constitutional
7. See Meese, Our Constitution's Design: The Implications for its Interpretation, 70
MARQ. L. REV. 381 (1987).
8. The leading proponent of the classical "interpretivist" position appears to be
Raoul Berger. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Berger, New The-
ories of "Interpretation" The Activist Flight from the Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1986). Less strict interpretivists, however, have adopted similar views. See A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
9. Fallon, supra note 5, at 1209-10.
10. Meese, supra note 7, at 381.
11. Id. at 382.
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provisions.., have been ratified by state conventions or legis-
latures on behalf of the people they represented. Is the rele-
vant intention, then, that of the drafters, the ratifiers or the
general populace?"' 12
Furthermore, there is hardly an abundance of extant
materials from which the intent of the Framers can be ascer-
tained. Again, as Judge Kaufman notes, both the official min-
utes of the Philadelphia Convention of 1789 and James
Madison's notes of the proceedings, published in 1840, tend
toward the terse and cursory, particularly with respect to the
judiciary. 13 Moreover, The Federalist Papers, a series of
eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay,
and James Madison in 1787 and 1788, which Mr. Meese and
other interpretivists invoke as primary evidence of "Framers'
intent," were political campaign literature. In point of fact,
the Papers were written to urge New York's ratification of the
Constitution and tended, therefore, to either "enunciate gen-
eral democratic theory or to rebut anti-Federalist arguments
S.. ."14 Such papers did not address the Bill of Rights or the
Civil War amendments, which had yet to be enacted. Finally,
if one does search The Federalist Papers, intending to discern
the Framers' intent, at least as to the Constitution proper, one
might be struck by James Madison's broad disclaimer:
Is it not the glory of the people of America that whilst they
have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times...
they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity.., to
overrule the suggestions of their own good sense, the knowl-
edge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own
experience?' 5
Certainly a good argument can be made that Madison never
intended his own morality and his own philosophy, or, for
that matter, the morality of the Framers, to govern American
society in perpetuity.
12. Kaufman, "hat Did the Founding Fathers Intend?, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 59.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 88 Qi. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Professor Jonathan Van Patten in his article on constitu-
tional ideology 16 questions whether those, like Mr. Meese,
who advocate strict interpretivism may justly claim a legacy
from the Constitution's Framers or whether the legacy is one
of ambiguity and flexibility, more properly claimed by the
likes of Supreme Court Justice William Brennan, who advo-
cates a more activist judiciary.' 7 The answer may be, as sug-
gested both by Professor Gordon Baldwin 8 and by United
States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, that the
legacy of the constitutional Framers is a legacy none of us
wants to embrace altogether. Indeed, the legacy begun 200
years ago was largely one of slavery and indentured servitude,
the conquest and subjugation of American Indians, the denial
of suffrage to women, and participation in the "democratic"
process only by landowners. As Justice Marshall noted in a
recent speech before the San Francisco Patent and Trademark
Law Association:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was
forever 'fixed' at the Philadelphia Convention .... Nor do I
find the wisdom, foresight and sense of justice exhibited by
the Framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the
government they devised was defective from the start, re-
quiring several amendments, a civil war and momentous so-
cial transformation to attain the system of constitutional
government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and
human rights, we hold as fundamental today. 9
Moreover, if Betty Southard Murphy is correct in her
premise that "the protection of individual economic rights
and the encouragement of materialism as the lynchpin of basic
freedom were the primary motivating forces behind the Fram-
ers' efforts in drafting the Constitution of the United States
16. Van Patten, The Consequences of Ideology: Constitutional Interpretation Ac-
cording to Original Intention and Contemporary Ratification, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 389,
390 (1987).
17. See Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
delivered at Georgetown University, Washington D.C. (Oct. 12, 1985) reprinted in 19
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 2, 7 (1985).
18. Baldwin, Celebrating the Constitution: The Virtues of its Vices and Vice Versa,
70 MARQ. L. REv. 422 (1987).
19. Taylor, Marshall Sounds Critical Note on Bicentennial, N.Y. Times, May 7,
1987, § A, at 1, col. 6.
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and structuring the new Republic,"2 then Justice Marshall is
also correct in his assessment that the Framers sacrificed
"moral principles for self-interest. ' 21 Certainly, as Ms. Mur-
phy points out, a good argument can be made that material-
ism, and particularly the veneration of individual property
rights, pervaded the Framers' fundamental constitutional val-
ues. Though there might be some dispute as to the extent of
the influence of materialism, there are vestiges which remain
even now in areas as sacrosanct as the first amendment right
of free speech. An examination, for example, of those United
States Supreme Court decisions dealing with the exercise of
free speech on privately owned property,22 discloses that the
first amendment, as interpreted by the Court, regularly yields
to private property interests. 23 As the Supreme Court ratio-
nalized in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner :24
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights
to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment
rights under circumstances where adequate alternative ave-
nues of communication exist. Such an accommodation
would diminish property rights without significantly enhanc-
ing the asserted right of free speech.25
In short, all things being equal, fifth amendment property
rights will predominate over first amendment free speech.
Furthermore, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 26 the
Supreme Court implied that a state statute granting access to
private property for free speech purposes can unconstitution-
ally infringe on private property interests and constitute a
"taking." This determination, in turn, will be based upon eco-
20. Murphy, supra note 3, at 444.
21. See supra note 19.
22. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalga-
mated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
23. For an insightful review of those cases dealing with the exercise of first amend-
ment freedoms on privately owned property, see Note, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -
Free Speech - Granting Access to Private Shopping Center Property for Free Speech Pur-
poses on the Basis of a State Constitutional Provision Does Not Violate the Shopping
Center Owner's Federal Constitutional Property Rights or First Amendment Free Speech
Rights, Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 100 S. Ct. 2035 (1980); 64 MARQ. L.
REV. 507 (1981).
24. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
25. Id. at 567.
26. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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nomic factors such as the economic impact of the state statute
and the extent of its interference with "reasonable investment-
backed expectations."27 Notwithstanding the significance of
individual property, however, evn the strict interpretivists
would concede that the preamble to the Constitution speaks of
securing "the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Poster-
ity," 28 not to ourselves and our "prosperity."
Moreover, the last two centuries since the adoption of the
Constitution have seen a shift away from the focus on individ-
ual property, at least in some respects. Witness the transition
in the nature of fourth amendment protection from the prop-
erty concept of a "constitutionally protected area" 29 in Olin-
stead v. United States'0 to an "individual privacy against
certain kinds of governmental intrusion"'" in Katz v. United
States. 2 At least in this area, the judiciary may have been less
willing to sacrifice "moral principles for self-interest" than the
Framers. In fact, the greatest progress of the last two centu-
ries since the adoption of the Constitution has been the abro-
gation of significant immoral aspects of the Framers' legacy.
It is thus no surprise that Professor Van Patten finds neither
Attorney General Edwin Meese nor Supreme Court Justice
William Brennan wholly consistent in their attitudes toward
the "Framers' intent." Even The Federalist Papers on occa-
sion reflect a naive view of the democratic process to which
few would subscribe today.33
To what end do we engage in the foregoing analysis? Per-
haps to point out the most fundamental failure of the strict
interpretivists; that is, their narrow focus on the written word
27. Id. at 83.
28. U.S. CONST. preamble.
29. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928).
30. Id.
31. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
which states in part:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republi-
can principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular
vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be
unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
The prevalence of pork barrel legislation and the accumulation of a staggering national
debt suggest the naivete of Madison's prediction that only legislation which benefits a
majority constituency will prevail.
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of the Constitution as limited by the Framers' intent. Con-
trary to the position taken by Attorney General Meese, the
written word of the Constitution is not the sole constraint to
"bind or limit discretion or governmental power."'34 Rather,
it is the structure of government created by the Constitution
that is the more viable constraint. And if there is any genius
to the Constitution, it is that the Constitution preordains a
dynamic order or process by which power is to be dispersed
and conflict is to be resolved. Thus, in a very real sense, the
Constitution acts not so much to provide clear answers as it
does to create a forum and frame issues - issues which in
many significant cases may require a decision by nine Justices
sitting on the United States Supreme Court. Furthermore,
those Justices must form a majority on a given issue to afford
any viable resolution.
Thus, we come upon the second of Attorney General
Meese's premises: that a judiciary which does anything less
than strictly adhere to the written word of the Constitution as
limited by the "Framers' intent" undermines the democratic
process. Why? Because the members of the United States
Supreme Court are not elected officials, and "judicial review
by judges with lifetime tenure does not seem to fit easily
within theories of democratic government. ' 35 Thus, when
judges overrule decisions made by other branches of govern-
ment on grounds not specified, contemplated and approved by
the Framers, the argument is that they usurp power from "the
people." More pragmatically, Mr. Meese's fear, and that of
Senator Strom Thurmond as well,3 6 is that non-interpretivist
or "activist" judges will bring to bear their own particular
views of morality and constitutionalism, parading their views
as if those views are entitled to constitutional credibility:
The problem arises, however, when the courts do not feel
bound by the original intention of a constitutional provision.
In such instances courts may sometimes be tempted to add
or subtract from the written constitution. In doing this,
judges occasionally justify what they have done by acting as
34. Meese, supra note 7, at 387.
35. Kaufman, Judges or Scholars: To Whom Shall We Look for Our Constitutional
Law?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 185 (1987).
36. Thurmond, The Bicentennial of the Constitution: A Time for Education, 70
MARQ. L. REV. 375, 378 (1987).
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though we have some extra-constitutional tradition where
doctrine and meaning have no fixed written source ....
Mr. Meese's solution is quite simply to reduce the Constitu-
tion to a statute: "The Framers would have seen no point in
writing down constitutional provisions if the courts did not
then interpret those written provisions in the same manner as
they would interpret any other written legal document, such
as a statute, a contract or a will."' 38 The inherent fallacy in
this logic is that one simply cannot suggest that the Constitu-
tion is no more than a statute (or the last will and testament of
the Framers) and yet the sublime fulfillment of the preamble39
in the same breath. In words whose intent no one would dis-
pute, the Constitution cannot be "the sow's ear" and "the silk
purse" at the same time.
Furthermore, Messrs. Meese and Thurmond are not the
first strict interpretivists, nor will they be the last, to advocate
a value-neutral process of constitutional interpretation, partic-
ularly with respect to the Constitution's most open-ended pro-
visions, such as the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 40 Yet what they propose in terms of the "Fram-
ers' intent" is not so much a value-neutral interpretation as it
is the proscription of a value-laden interpretation - specifi-
cally values other than their own. In other words, insofar as
their own values are promulgated by the courts, they are satis-
fied that the courts are properly invoking neutral fundamental
constitutional values. Thus, they masquerade their own moral
views under the guise of the "Framers' intent." In this re-
spect, the strict interpretivists suffer the same tragic flaw as
the activists. The point is that "value-neutral" is probably an
37. Meese, supra note 7, at 387. Mr. Meese is not alone nor the first to espouse this
approach. See, e.g., Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (1986).
38. Meese, supra note 7, at 387.
39. We, the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
U.S. CONST. preamble.
40. See, e.g., H. BALL, JUDICIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP OR FIAT? (1978); J. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
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impossible standard and may ultimately, as Solzhenitsyn sug-
gests, portend the demise of Western society because Eastern
cultures will not accept our spiritual mediocrity.
Nevertheless, it is folly to suggest that moral and social
policy considerations, as espoused by the human beings sitting
on the Court, play no role in constitutional interpretation.
That they must and do is particularly evident in those cases
involving the reasonableness of searches under the fourth
amendment where technological advancement has far ex-
ceeded even the imaginings of such notables as Benjamin
Franklin. (Since he signed the Constitution, is he not also a
"Framer?"). The tendency of some Supreme Court Justices to
consistently test the reasonableness of a particular government
intrusion by balancing it against "the public interest in effec-
tive law enforcement" 41 suggests that some who identify
themselves as interpretivists have done no more than substi-
tute the moral judgment of law enforcement officers for funda-
mental constitutional values. As between the moral judgment
of a law enforcement officer and a judge, I would take the
judge. After all, it was the judiciary whom the Framers en-
trusted with constitutional interpretation, not the constables.
In addition, of course, there are institutional, functional
and procedural safeguards to the risk that activist judges will,
by means of their own moral values, encroach upon the will of
"the people." Article III, section 2 of the Constitution and
the eleventh amendment themselves limit federal court juris-
diction. Furthermore, courts must rely upon other branches
of government to enforce their judgments which, for the most
part, are not self-enforcing. As Professor Michael McChrys-
tal points out, courts have multiple members who must secure
agreement among a majority if their decisions are to be via-
ble.42 And finally, their decisions must be principled and pub-
lished, at least to the parties. They are thus subject to public
debate and criticism.
In the end, what is clear is that the Framers' intent, stand-
ing alone, is a vestige of utopia that can never be workably
41. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985); United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798, 804 (1982).
42. See, McChrystal, Responding to the Celebration: The Inscrutable Constitution,
70 MARQ. L. REV. 487, 490 (1987).
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attained. What is needed, perhaps, is a contemporary theory
such as Fallon's "constructivist coherence"4 3 which prioritizes
and coherently rationalizes current methods of constitutional
analysis. These include plain or historical meaning derived
from the text, Framers' intent where ascertainable, prior judi-
cial precedent, and even value judgments based upon moral
and social policy. The significance of such a theory lies in its
potential for actual application beyond mere scholarship. In
any event, what we must seek - judges, scholars, and theore-
ticians - is constitutional order, not utopia.
43. Fallon, supra note 5.
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